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Abstract
The paper proposes a model of on-the-job search and industry dynamics in which search
is directed. Firms permanently differ in productivity levels, their production function features
constant returns to scale, and search costs are convex in search intensity. Wages are determined
in a competitive manner, as firms advertise wage contracts (expected discounted incomes) so as
to balance wage costs and search costs (queue length). An important assumption is that a firm
is able to sort out its coordination problems with its employees in such a way that the on-the-job
search behavior of workers maximizes the match surplus. Our model has several novel features.
First, it is close in spirit to the competitive model, with a tractable and unique equilibrium,
and is therefore useful for empirical testing. Second, the resulting equilibrium gives rise to an
efficient allocation of resources. Third, the equilibrium is characterized by a job ladder, where
unemployed workers apply to low-productivity firms offering low wages, and then gradually move
on to more productive, higher-paying firms. Finally, the equilibrium offers different implications
for the dynamics of job-to-job transitions than existing models of random search.
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∗A simpler version of the model with preliminary results was published in the note ”Job-to-job movements in a
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1 Introduction
There is broad evidence that job-to-job transitions play an important role in the labour market.
The last decade has witnessed a growing literature modeling and estimating firm dynamics, job-to-
job and unemployment-to-employment transitions, as well as wage distributions. This literature is
broadly coherent with the the DMP (Diamond, Mortensen, Pissarides) search paradigm. Most of
these contributions assume that search is random, and firms can not use wages as an instrument for
fast recruiting.
In the present paper we set up and analyze a model of directed search with identical workers and
large and (ex post) heterogeneous firms. In competitive search equilibrium, firms advertise wages and
workers choose optimally which firms to apply to. On-the-job search is efficient, in the sense that
workers search behaviour maximizes the joint income of workers and firms. We obtain a tractable
model of on-the-job search, which delivers an efficient allocation of resources, and in which on-the-job
search is an optimal response to search frictions and heterogeneous firms.
The equilibrium leans towards a job ladder, where unemployed workers search for low-productivity
firms offering low wages, and then gradually advances to higher paid jobs. Productive firms pay higher
wages and grow faster than less productive firms. The economic logic underlying the job ladder is
that workers with low current wages are the most eager to get a job quickly, while the productive
firms are the most eager to get workers quickly. If one side of the market matches quickly, it follows
from the matching function that the other side matches slowly. Hence, efficiency requires that the
most eager workers (the unemployed) search for the least eager firms (low-productivity firms), while
the least eager workers (employed in the second most productive firm) search for the most eager firms
(the most productive ones).
In the first part of the paper, we only allow for a finite number of firm types. In the resulting
equilibrium, worker search is not completely ordered, in the sense that workers employed in the same
firms may search for firms with different productivities. Furthermore, when the number of firm types
increases, no clear convergence pattern emerges. We therefore extend the model and allow for a
continuum of firm types. In the resulting equilibrium there is a one-to-one correspondence between
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the productivity of a worker’s current employer and of the productivity of the firm she is searching
for. Unemployed workers randomize over an interval of low productivity firms.
Our proof of existence of an equilibrium for continuous types relies on Schauders fixed point theo-
rem. We do not employ the commonly used version found in Stokey and Lucas (1989), which requires
equicontinuity. Instead we define equilibrium in terms of distribution functions, the distribution of
workers over firms and the distribution of applications. Since Helly’s selection theorem ensures that
distribution functions form a compact and convex set (in the set of all functions on the unit interval),
we can apply Schauder’s fixed theorem in it’s general topological formulation. This approach may
be of broader interest, since it circumvents the technical complication of equicontinuity and makes
Schauders fixed point theorem applicable to a larger class of equilibrium models.
The paper also delivers a method for mapping, continuously, the set of all distribution functions
(which may be discontinuous) into a set of continuous distribution functions. As equilibrium in search
models (and other models as well) often can be characterized by distribution functions, we believe
that our methods may be useful in many applications.
In an extension section we explore in more details the role of convexity of the search costs for
job-to-job transitions. We assume that search costs are linear, and introduce instead convex hiring
costs. Hiring costs accrue conditional on firms’ hiring, and are assumed to be convex in the intensity
of the flow of new workers. We show that in the resulting equilibrium there is no wage dispersion,
as the optimal wage is independent of firm productivity. Furthermore, there is no on-the-job search.
We thus conclude that with directed search, convex vacancy costs are essential to obtain on-the-job
search.
Our model is consistent with some stylized facts regarding job-to-job movements: 1) productivity
differences across firms are large and persistent and different productivity level across firms coexist
in the labor market, 2) on-the-job search is prevalent and worker flows between firms are large, and
3) more productive firms are larger and pay higher wages than less productive firms. In addition,
our model gives rise to empirical predictions that differ substantially from those of existing models
of on-the-job search. For instance, the Burdett-Mortensen (1998) model predicts a weak relationship
between the wage before the job switch and the distribution of wages after the job switch. More
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specifically, the wage after successful on-the-job search is a draw from the wage offer distribution
truncated at the wage in the previous job. According to our model, workers employed in firms offering
relatively high wages (i.e., have high productivity) search for jobs that offer strictly higher wages than
do workers employed in firms offering lower wages initially, and thus different workers face different
distributions.
There is a substantial literature on job-to-job movements. First, Davis and Haltiwanger (1999)
show that job-to-job flows are huge. Lentz and Mortensen (2005) find that reallocation of workers from
low- to high productivity firms are important for economic growth. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
were among the first to structurally estimating a search model with on-the-job search. Other recent
papers on on-the-job search include Lentz and Mortensen (2008, 2012), Bagger and Lentz (2014),
Bagger et al (2013), Lise and Robin (2013), and Lamadon et al (2013). We deliver an alternative
framework, based on directed search, suitable for empirical analysis.
There exist papers with directed on-the-job search. Moen and Rosen (2004) analyse human capital
investments in the presence of on-the-job search. Shi (2009) and Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011) study
directed on-the-job search. These model have similar structure to our theory in terms of employment
contracts, but there are fundamental differences. Most importantly, in these papers firms are identical
and differences in productivity are match specific. Furthermore, as firms are identical in the search
phase, the equilibrium in Menzio and Shi is block recursive, essentially implying that a zero profit
condition applies in all submarkets.
Our key motivating factor is that productivity difference across firms are large and persistent (Lentz
and Mortensen, 2008). Hence, the model should capture this fact. In our model firms productivity
are indeed permanently heterogeneous. After sinking a cost K, firms draw productivity yi and will
keep this productivity until they exit the market. Hence a zero profit condition only applies ex ante,
not when firms are searching for workers. This dramatically changes the nature of equilibrium and
breaks the block recursivity of Monzio and Shi (2011). Delacroix and Shi (2006) analyse an urn-ball
model of the labour market with on-the-job search, and show that equilibrium is characterized by a
job ladder. Again it is assumed that firms are identical. Furthermore, on-the-job search is inefficient,
and solely caused by imperfect contracting between workers and firms. Our modeling of firms are
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similar to that of Kaas and Kircher (2013), but they do not allow for on-the-job search. Finally, our
paper is related to Mortensen and Wright (2002), who analyze competitive search equilibrium when
workers differ in income during unemployment.
The paper proceeds as flows. Section 2 presents the model with a discrete firm type space, while
we allow for a continuous type space in section 3. In section 4 we introduce linear search cost and
convex hiring costs. Section 5 discusses the empirical implications of our model, while the last section
concludes.
2 Model with finite number of firm types
The labor market is populated by a measure 1 of identical, risk neutral and infinitely lived workers
with discount rate r. Workers can search on and off the job at no cost.1
Ex ante identical and risk neutral firms enter at cost K > 0. Conditional upon entry, the firm
learns its productivity y ∈ {y1, y2, ..., yn}, with y1 < y2 < ... < yn. The probability of obtaining
productivity yi is denoted by αi with Σiαi = 1. The productivity of a firm is fixed throughout its life.
Unemployed workers have access to an income flow y0 < y1. Firms discount the future at the rate r,
and die at rate δ. In addition, workers separate from firms at an exogenous rate s.
Firms post vacancies and wages to maximize expected profits. Vacancy costs c(v) are convex in
the number of vacancies posted. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that c′(0) = c(0) = 0.2
As will be clear below, the search market may endogenously separate into submarkets, consisting
of a set of workers and firms with vacancies searching for each other. Firms can not simultaneously
search in more than one sub-market. In each submarket, the flow of matches is determined by a
constant-returns-to scale matching function. If a measure u of workers search for a measure v of
vacancies, the flow of matches is x(u, v). Let θ = v/u, and define p(θ) = x(1, θ) and q(θ) = x(1/θ, 1).
Finally, let η = |q′(θ)θ/q| denote the absolute value of the elasticity of q with respect to θ. In order
to ensure that a firm’s profit as a function of the advertised wage has a unique maximum (for each
1We relax this assumption in Section 3.
2Convex hiring costs are often assumed in search models, see Bertola and Cabalero (1994) and Bertola and Garibaldi
(2001). Convex hiring costs may be rationalized by decreasing returns to scale in the firm’s recruitment department.
Convex hiring costs can be seen as a generalization of Burdet Mortensen (1998), where the number of vacancies is
exogenously fixed. Analogously, the search costs of workers are usually assumed to be convex (Pissarides 2000). Finally,
our assumption of convex hiring costs have empirical support, see Yashiv (2000a,b).
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type), we assume that η(θ) is non-decreasing in θ. It can be shown that this is not necessary for the
equilibrium to exist.
We assume that a worker’s on-the-job search behaviour is chosen so as to maximize the joint
income of the worker and his employee. Thus, the worker, when choosing between different firms to
search for, internalizes the loss for the employer if he quits. This assumption is convenient, and first
made in Moen and Rosen (2004) and later in Shi (2009) and in Menzio and Shi (2010,2011). There
are various wage contracts that implement this behavior, see Moen and Rosen (2004). In particular,
the worker may buy the job from the firm, in which case the worker is the residual claimant. Or the
wage contract may include a quit fee equal to the capital loss for the firm associated with losing the
worker. In principle the worker and the firm may also contract directly upon the wages the worker
should target for when doing on the-job-search.
Efficient on-the-job search implies that the wages paid to the worker in the current job do not
influence her on-the-job search behavior. It follows that a worker employed in a firm of type i will
never search for a job in another firm of type j ≤ i. Such jobs cannot profitably offer a wage that
exceeds the productivity in the current firm.
Firms advertise and workers search for contracts. For any given contract σ, let W (σ) denote the
associated net present income of the worker that obtains the job. As will be clear below, W (σ) is a
rather complicated object, as it includes the expected income to the worker from on-the-job search,
which again depends on wages advertised by more productive firms and the probability rates of getting
these jobs.
Consider an economy where a countable set of NPV wages W1, ...,Wl, ... are advertised, each by
a strictly positive measure of firms. Let θ1, ..., θl, ... denote the associated vector of labor market
tightness. The set of pairs (θl,Wl) is denoted by Ω, and is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Let Mi i = 0, 1, ..., n denote the joint expected discounted income flow of a worker and a job in a
firm of type i, where the gains from on-the-job search is included. Since on-the-job search is efficient,
it follows that Mi is given by
rMi = yi + (s+ δ)(M0 −Mi) + max
l∈I
p(θl)[Wl −Mi] (1)
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where I is the set of submarkets. The first term is the flow production value created on the job. The
second term captures the expected capital loss due to job separation, which happens at rate s + δ,
and reduces the joint income to M0 (since the firm then earns zero on this match). The last term
shows the expected joint gain from on-the-job search. Since the current wage is a pure transfer from
the employer to the worker, it does not appear in the expression.
From (1) it follows that the optimal search behaviour of a worker depends on her current position,
as this influences Mi. Hence our model is characterized with what we refer to as endogenous worker
heterogeneity, captured by the workers’ output yi in their current job. We refer to a worker that
currently works in a firm of type i as of type i−searching worker or just type i worker (note that all
worker ‘‘ types’’ are equally productive, the difference in output reflects differences in the productivity
of the current employer).
The indifference curve of a worker of type i shows combinations of θ and W that gives a joint
income equal to Mi. We can represent this as θi = fi(W ;M).
3 It follows that fi is defined implicitly
by the equation
rMi = yi + (s+ δ)(M0 −Mi) + p(fi(W,M))[W −Mi] (2)
where Mi is the equilibrium joint income in firm i. It follows that for Mi < Wi
fi(W ;M) = p
−1(
(r + s+ δ)Mi − yi − (s+ δ)M0
W −Mi ) (3)
The indifference curve is defined for all W , not only the values advertised in equilibrium. Define
f(W ;M) = min
i∈{0,1,...,n}
fi(W ;M) (4)
The function f(W ;M) is thus the lower envelope of the set of functions fi(W ;M). In equilibrium,
f(W ;M) shows the relationship between the wage advertised and the labor market tightness in a
submarket. Suppose that for a given W , the minimum in (4) is obtained for worker type i′. This
worker type will then flow into the market up to the point where θ = fi′(W ;M). At this low labor
market tightness, no other worker types want to enter this submarket. The labor market tightness is
thus given by fi′(W ;M), and only workers of type i
′ enter the market.
3Strictly speaking, fi only depends on Mi and M0, but we write it as a function of the vector M for convenience.
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Then we turn to the firms. It follows that at any point in time, a firm of type j maximizes the
value of search given by4
pij = −c(v) + vjq(θ)[Mj −Wj ]. (5)
where Wj is the wages paid by the firm. The first part is the flow cost of posting vacancies, while the
second part is the gain from search. The firm’s maximization problem thus reads
max
v,W
{−c(v) + vq(θ)[Mj −W ]} s.t. θ = f(W,M)
Denote the associated maximum profit flow by pi∗j . The expected profit of a firm entering the market
as a type j firm is thus
Πj =
pi∗j
r + δ
(6)
Denote the set of wages that solves j’s maximization problem by Wj(M). Below we show that Wj
has a finite number of elements. Denote the optimal measure of vacancies by vj(M). Note that the
net gain from search is the same for all W ∈Wj(M), the number of vacancies posted by firm j is the
same for all advertised wages W ∈Wj(M).
Define N = (N0, N1, ..., Nj , ...), where Nj denotes the measure of workers employed in type j firms.
Let the vector τ˜j = (τj1, τj2, ...) denote the distribution of vacancies posted by firms of type j over
the different submarkets. Similarly, let κ˜j = (κj1, κj2, ...) denote the distribution of searching type j
workers over the different submarkets. Finally, let k denote the total number of firms in the market.
In steady state, inflow of workers into type j firms has to be equal to outflow, hence
k
∑
l
αjvj τ˜jlq(θl) = Nj [s+ δ +
∑
l
pjl(θl)κ˜jl] (7)
for all j. For unemployed workers, the corresponding inflow-outflow equation reads
(s+ δ)(1−N0) =
∑
l
p0l(θl)κ˜0lN0 (8)
The labor market tightness θl in market l is given by
θk = k
∑
j αj τ˜jlvj∑
j κ˜jlNj
(9)
We are now in a position to define the general equilibrium.
4At any point in time, the firm decides on the number of vacancies and the wages attached to them. This only
influences profits through future hirings, and is independent of the stock of existing workers.
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Definition 2.1 General equilibrium is defined as a vector of asset values M∗,wages W ∗, employment
stocks N∗, labor market tightness θ∗, distributions of searching workers κ˜∗j , distributions of vacancies
τ˜∗j , and a number of firms k such that
1. Profit maximization: i) W ∗ = ∪nj=1Wj(M∗) ii) vj = vj(M∗) iii) If τjl > 0, then W ∗l ∈Wj(M∗).
2. Optimal worker search: rM∗i ≥ yi+(s+δ)(M∗0 −M∗i )+p(θl)[W ∗l −M∗i ], with equality if κil > 0.
3. Optimal entry: The expected profit of entering the market is equal to the entry cost K, i.e.,
EΠj = K
4. Aggregate consistency: Equations (7), (8) and (9) are satisfied.
In addition we make the following equilibrium refinement : if more than one allocation satisfies the
equilibrium conditions, the market picks the equilibrium where aggregate output is highest.5 This
can be rationalized by assuming that a market maker sets up the markets (as in Moen 1997).
2.1 Characterizing equilibrium
Before we prove existence of equilibrium, we will derive some properties of the equilibrium (assuming
that it exists). First we will derive properties for f(W,M).
Consider an arbitrary set of submarkets Ω, and let M denote the corresponding vector of asset
values defined by (1). Let W s denote the highest wage in Ω. By construction, M exists and is unique.
Furthermore, in the appendix we show that y0/r ≤ M0 < M1 < ... < Mn and (r + s + δ)Mi − yi is
decreasing in i. If we restrict our attention to the case were W s < yn, it follows that Mn =
yn+sM0
r+s .
If Mj ≥ W s, workers employed in firms of type j or higher do not search. In this case (r +
s + δ)Mj = yj + (s + δ)M0, and it follows from (2) thatfi(W,M) = 0 for W > Mj . It follows
that f(W,M) is discontinuous at W = Mj . If Mi < W
s, type i-searching workers will search,
hence fi(W,M) = f(W,M) for some W (at least the wages they actually search for). In this case
(r + s+ δ)Mi > yi + (s+ δ)M0, and it follows from (3) that fi(W ;M) > 0 for all W > Mi.
5We cannot rule out that the first order conditions of the planner’s maximization problem has more than one solution,
in which case the equilibrium of the model may have more than one solution as well.
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Lemma 2.1 For any vector Ω and associated vector M defined by (1), the following holds
a) Single crossing: For any i, j, i < j, Mj < W
s, the equation fi(W ;M) = fj(W ;M) has exactly
one solution, and at this point
|dfi(W ;M)
dW
| < |dfj(W ;M)
dW
|
b) Suppose Mn′−1 < W s < Mn′ . For i ∈ {0, 1, 2..., n′−1}, define W i as the solution to fi(W ;M) =
fi+1(W ;M). Then it follows that
i) If W ∈ (W i,W i+1), i ≤ n− 1, then f(W ;M) = fi(W ;M)
ii) If W > Wn−1 then f(W ;M) = fn′+1(W ;M)
ii) If W > Mn′ then f(W ;M) = fn′+1(W ;M) = 0,
c) f(θ) is discontinuous at Mn′+1, as limW→M−
n′+1
f(W ;M) > 0 while limW→M+
n′+1
f(W,M) = 0.
d) For all W in (M0,Mn′), f is strictly decreasing in W , continuous, and continuously dif-
ferentiable except at the points (W 1,W 2, ...,Wn
′
). At these points, limW→W i− |df(W ;M)/dW | <
limW→W i+ |df(W ;M)/dW |.
Property a) follows directly from the fact that workers employed in more productive firms are
more willing to trade off a high job finding rate for a high wage than are workers employed in less
productive firms. Property b) follows more or less directly from property a), and states that there are
line segments [W i,W i+1] such that firms advertising a wage W ∈ [W i,W i+1] attracts workers hired
in firms of type i only. In addition, if no wages above Mn are advertised in equilibrium, if a submarket
with wages above Mn did open up it would obtain a labor market tightness of zero. Furthermore,
at Mn is the function f(W ;M) discontinuous in W . Properties c) and d) state that except for this,
f(W ;M) is continuous everywhere and differentiable everywhere except at the intersection points
(W 1,W 2, ...,Wn
′
).
In order to characterize the equilibrium of the market, the following result is useful (recall that
η(θ) = −q′(θ)θ/q(θ)):
Lemma 2.2 a) In any non-empty submarket there is exactly one type of firms, say j, and one type
of workers, say i (working in a type i firm). The equilibrium wage W ∗ij in this submarket is uniquely
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determined as
η(θ∗l )
1− η(θ∗l )
=
W ∗ij −M∗i
M∗j −W ∗ij
(10)
where θ∗l is the labor market tightness in that submarket.
The lemma simplifies characterization of equilibrium. Each worker-firm combination leads to at
most one operating submarket, and each submarket can be attributed to exactly one worker-firm
combination. Hence we can index by ij a submarket in which workers currently employed in firms of
type i and firms of type j search for each-other. Furthermore, the vectors of distributions of searching
workers on submarkets, κ˜j , can be described as an n×n matrix κ, where where κij gives the fraction
of workers employed in firms of type i that search in the ij-submarket. Note that κij = 0 for all j ≤ i.
Similarly, the vector of distributions τ˜j of vacancies on submarkets as an n × n matrix τ , where τij
denote the fraction of firms of type j searching in the ij-submarket. Again τij = 0 if i ≥ j. It follows
trivially that the equilibrium satisfies the following conditions (with M∗ij = M
∗
j −M∗i )
rM∗i = yi − (s+ δ)M∗0i + max
j
p(θ∗ij)ηM
∗
ij (11)
W ∗ij = M
∗
i + ηM
∗
ij for all i, j|κij > 0 (12)
c′(vj) = (1− η)M∗ijq(θ∗ij) for all i, j|κij > 0 (13)
The first condition defines joint income and ensures efficient on-the-job search. The second equation
defines the traditional efficient rent sharing in competitive search equilibrium, the Mortensen-Hosios
condition. The third condition equates the marginal cost of vacancy posting to its expected benefit.
Since the value of search is the same in all submarkets a firm operates, vj is independent of i.
Remark 2.1 Note that all firms with productivity strictly higher than y0 are active in equilibrium.
Since workers search equally well on and off jobs, the joint income of a worker and a firm of the lowest
type, M1, is then strictly greater than M0. Since, by assumption c
′(0) = c(0) = 0, firms of type 1
offers a wage strictly greater than M0 and attracts workers.
We are now ready to show that the equilibrium exists. In the standard competitive search equi-
librium, a zero profit condition applies to all submarkets, and make the model block recursive (see
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Menzio and Shi 2010). In this model, the zero profit condition only holds ex ante, not for each firm
type separately.
Proposition 2.1 The equilibrium exists.
In Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996), it is shown that with no on-the-job search, wages are set so
that search externalities are internalized. As a result, the equilibrium allocation is socially efficient.
We want to show that this result carries over to our model with on-the-job search. We say that
the equilibrium allocation is efficient if it maximizes the net present income of the economy along the
steady state path, where the net present income is defined as
W =
∫ ∞
0
[
n∑
j=0
Njyj −
n∑
j=1
αjkc(vj)− aK]e−rtdt
Proposition 2.2 The equilibrium is efficient in the sense that it maximizes W given the law of
motions of N0, N1, ..., Nn.
Our next proposition characterizes wage distributions and search behavior of workers and firms
Proposition 2.3 Maximum separation:
a) Let k < l. Then workers in a firm of type l always search for jobs with strictly higher wages
than workers employed in firms of type k. Firms of type l always offer a strictly higher wage than
firms of type k.
b) Let Ik denote the set of worker types searching for firms of type k. Consider Ik and Il, k > l.
Then all elements in Ik are greater than or equal to all elements in Il. Hence Ik and Il have at most
one common element.
From a) it follows that high-type firms grow quicker than low-type firms, even if they search for
the same worker types. Thus, firms of different productivities may offer different wages and attract
workers at different speeds, as an efficient response to search frictions. Furthermore, for all firm types,
the hiring flow is constant, while the separation flow is proportional to size. Thus, even the most
productive firms don’t grow indefinitely, conditional upon survival the size converges to a steady state
level.
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From b) it follows that the market, to the largest extent possible, separates workers and firms so
that the low-type workers search for the low-type firms. Note the similarity with the non-assortative
matching results in the search literature (Shimer and Smith, 2001, Eeckout and Kirkcher, 2008). If
the production technology is linear in the productivities of the worker and the firm, it is optimal that
the high-type firms match with the low-type workers and vice versa. Similarly, workers in a firm with
a high current productivity search for vacancies with high productivity, and vice versa.
From an efficiency point of view, the result can be understood by recalling that quick vacancy
filling requires long worker queues, so that workers find jobs slowly. It is therefore optimal that the
most “patient”workers, i.e., the workers employed in firms with high productivity, search for the most
“impatient”firms, the firms with the highest productivity. Similarly, the most impatient workers (the
unemployed workers) search for the most patient firms (with the lowest productivity).
3 Continuum of types
With a discrete distribution of firm types, our model does not give rise to a pure job ladder. Proposition
2.3 gives us some ordering of the search behaviour of workers and firms at different rings of the job
ladder, but the ordering is not complete. Workers employed by firms with the same productivity
initially, may end up in firms with different productivities after successful on-the-job search. Likewise,
firms with the same productivity may attract and hire workers employed in firms with different
productivities. Furthermore, as the number of firm types increases, no clear pattern of convergence
of search strategies emerge. This calls for a model with a continuum of firm types.
In this subsection we therefore analyze the equilibrium of the model with a continuum of types.
In this case there is a one-to-one mapping between the productivity of a worker’s current employer
and future employer. Our main objective is to show that such an equilibrium exists.
To this end, let G(y) denote the cumulative distribution function of a continuous distribution on
the set Y ≡ [ymin, ymax], where ymin > y0, so that the lowest firm productivity is strictly larger than
unemployed income. The associated density is denoted g(y). We will define the equilibrium in terms
of cumulative distribution functions.
To simplify the proofs we assume that each firm advertises one vacancy, hence the total measure of
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vacancies in the economy is equal to the measure of firms. While the number of firms is endogenous,
the idea of a fixed measure of vacancy per firm is an extreme form of convexity, and it is thus coherent
with the model of Section 2. Note that this does not imply that firms will have the same size; more
productive firms will set a higher wage, attract workers more quickly, and hence grow more quickly
than less productive firms.
In order to avoid technical issues at the top of the distribution, we assume that there is an
(arbitrarily small) cost of worker search. We denote the cost by ε. For notational simplicity we
assume that the firm incur the cost (for instance due to lower worker effort), and that y measures
output net of search costs. A firm of type y where the worker does not search thus has output flow
y + ε, while it has an output flow of y if the employees search.6
Suppose the market consists of a continuum of submarkets (θ(y),W (y)), where as above i is an
index. Since there is a cost associated with worker search, workers in firms with productivity above
a certain threshold ys will not search. We write the expected joint income of a worker and a job in a
firm as
(r + s+ δ)M(y) = y + max
y∈Y
p(θ(y)) [W (y)−M(y)] for y < ys (14)
M(y) =
y + ε
r + s+ δ
for y ≥ ys (15)
At the threshold ys, the firm is indifferent between searching and not searching. Hence, the flow cost
is equal to the flow gain from search. It follows that ys is implicitly defined by the equation
ε = max
y
p(θ(y))(W (y)−M(ys)) (16)
As above, define θ = f(W ;M(y)) as a family of indifference curves of searching workers of type y.
Define f(W ) ≡ miny f((W ;M(y)). As f and M are continuous functions, this minimum problem is
well defined.
Firms set wages so as to maximize the profit flow. As in the finite case, the firms thus maximize
pi = q(θ)[M(y)−W ] S.T. θ = f(W )
6Delacroix and Shi (2006) make a similar assumption.
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For any y, let y(W ) denote the wage(s) that solves the maximization problem, and z(y) the worker
types that are attracted to the firm. Hence z(y) solves
f(W (y)) = f(W (y,M(z(y)))
It is straight-forward to show that z(y) is single-valued for all y and continuous for all y ∈ [ymin, ymax]
except at one point yu. The value yu is defined as the highest productivity a firm will have and still
attract unemployed workers. Thus, z(y) = y0 for all y ≤ yu while z(y) > ymin for all y > yu (with
limy→yu+ z(y) = ymin). As will be clear below, it follows by construction that z(y) is differentiable
on (ymin, ymax) except at the point yu. Furthermore, z(y) is strictly increasing in y and hence has an
inverse on (yu, z(ymax)). Finally, z(ymax) = ys.
It follows easily that the optimal sharing rule still applies,
(r + s+ δ)M(y) = y + ηp(θ(z−1(y))[M(z−1(y))−M(y)] (17)
This optimal sharing rule implies that given the worker type y that firms attract, the wage is optimally
set. Furthermore, from the envelope theorem it follows that
M ′(y) =
1
r + s+ δ + p(θ(z−1(y))
(18)
Note that (18) is a necessary condition for efficient on-the-job search from the worker side. From
the sharing rule (14), W is strictly increasing in y, and hence that θ is strictly decreasing in y. The
single-crossing property then ensures that this is also a sufficient condition for maximum. Hence it
follows that f(W (y),M(z−1(y)) = f(W (y)).
Let N(y) denote the cumulative distribution of workers on firms (including unemployment) in the
economy. In other words, N(y) is the fraction of workers either unemployed or employed in firms
with productivity at most y. For notational convenience we denote the fraction of unemployed by u
as before.
Let X(y) denote the measure of workers searching for jobs with productivity at most y. Unem-
ployed workers randomize over which firms to search for on the interval [ymin, yu]. For yu < y < ymax,
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it follows that X(y) can be written as
X(y) = u+
∫ z(y)
yu
n(y)dy
Denote the associated density by x(y) Let θ(y) denote the labor market tightness in the market in
which firms of type y recruits. Note that the workers in this submarket is of type z(y). It follows that
θ(y) =
kg(y)
x(y)
(19)
Finally, firms enter up to the point where the net present value of expected profits equals the entry
cost K, ∫ ymax
ymin
pi(y)
r + s+ δ
dy = K (20)
Definition 3.1 The equilibrium of the model is two distribution functions X(y) and N(y) with densi-
ties x(y) and n(y), a wage distribution W (y), a labor market tightness distribution θ(y), a distribution
of joint incomes M(y), a search function z(y), and numbers yu, ys and k such that
1. M(y) satisfies (14)
2. Optimal wages: W (y) maximizes the profit flow q(θ)(M(y)−W (y)) subject to θ = f(W ),
3. Optimal search: f(W (y)) = f(W (y),M(z(y))) for y ≤ ys.
4. For y ≥ ys, employees do not search. The threshold ys is implicitly defined by (16).
5. Zero profit: The zero profit condition (20) is satisfied.
6. Labor market consistency: θ(y) = kg(y)x(y) .
7. Inflow equals outflow in all markets:
kgq(θ(y)) = [s+ δ]n(y) for y > ys (21)
kgq(θ(y)) = [s+ δ + p(θ(z−1(y))n]n(y) for y ∈ [ymin, ys] (22)
(1− u)(s+ δ) =
∫ yu
ymin
x(y)p(θ(y))dy
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8. Aggregate consistency: ∫ yu
ymin
x(y)dy = u (23)∫ z(y)
yu
n(y)dy = u+X(y) (24)
u+
∫ ymax
ymin
n(y)dy = 1 (25)
Our goal is to define a mapping of which a fixed point is an equilibrium. Before entering that task,
we point out two important properties of cumulative distribution functions which form the basis of
our existence proof.
Property 1
Cumulative distributions are monotone functions, and thus by Lebesgue’s Theorem (Royden Fitzpatrick
p. 112) are differentiable almost everywhere. This implies that any cumulative distribution function
gives rise to a probability density function (with potential mass points).
Property 2
The subset of cumulative distribution functions on a closed interval [a, b], is contained in the topo-
logical vector space of all functions (with the sup norm) on [a, b]. This subset is obviously convex.
Furthermore, Helly’s selection theorem (Helly 1912, Surhone et al., 2010) gives that this subset is
compact.
The first property ensures the existence of the distribution functions x(y), n(y) or z′(y) almost
everywhere (since z(y) is a distribution).
The second property is important when applying Schauder’s fixed point theorem. The theorem
asserts that if K is a convex subset of a topological vector space V and Γ is a continuous mapping of
K into itself so that Γ(K) is contained in a compact subset of K, then T has a fixed point. See also
Istratescu (2001), which provides an equivalent definition.
In many economic applications, the mapping is defined on the set of continuous functions, and
this set is not compact. It is therefore usual to apply a variant of Schauder’s fixed point theorem that
does not require that Γ(K) is contained in a compact subset of K, but instead requires that Γ(K) is
an equicontinuous family of functions , see Stokey and Lucas (1989), p 520. Showing equicontinuity
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of Γ(K) is often cumbersome. In our case, the set of cumulative distributions do not form an equicon-
tinuous family. However, the set of cumulative distributions have two redeeming properties that we
recalled above. Therefore, the requirements of Schauder’s fixed point theorem is trivially satisfied as
long as Γ is continuous.
Below we will construct a mapping
Γ : (X(y), N(y), k,M0, y
s)→ (Xˆ(y), Nˆ(y), kˆ, Mˆ0, yˆs),
where X(y) ∈ CD[ymin, ymax], N(y) ∈ CD[y0, ymax], k ∈ [0, kmax], M0 ∈ [0,M0,max] and ys ∈
[ymin, ymax].
The mapping will make sense for all pairs of distributions X(y) and N(y), but we will restrict the
subset of pairs where N(y) > X(y) (which also is a convex set), as the search technology is directed
towards more productive firms.
Although Schauders’s fixed point theorem does not require the elements in the domain to be
continuous functions (although the mapping as such has to be continuous), it is convenient in the
updating algorithm (which we will state below) to have continuity. We solve this technical challenge
by mapping a given cumulative distribution to a continuous cumulative distribution satisfying a growth
constraint. In technical terms the continuous cumulative distributions have a derivative bounded by
a fixed positive number a. In other words, we construct a mapping Φ : CD[b, c] to CCD[b, c], where
CCD[b, c] denotes the set of all continuous distributionson the interval [b, c]. As the mapping Φ
will be part of the Γ : (X(y), N(y), k,M0, y
s) → (Xˆ(y), Nˆ(y), kˆ, Mˆ0, yˆs), the map Φ itself needs to
be continuous. This severely restricts the list of candidate maps. In particular, any mapping that
leaves already continuous distributions unchanged, and only removes discontinuities for discontinuous
distributions, is necessarily discontinuous. A proof of this result is given in the appendix.
Before we give the formal definition of Φ, it may be helpful to give the intuition behind the
construction. Consider a cumulative distribution F defined on the interval [b, c]. Imagine that we
start at b and construct a cumulative distribution that meets the growth constraint a, in the following
way: whenever F grows faster than ax, we divide F into two parts, F aLs , a continuous function
with derivative equal to a, and store the excess probability mass in a function T aF . That is, F (y) =
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F aLs (y) + T
a
F (y) for all y. As soon as the growth rate falls below a again, we start to redistribute
the accumulated probability mass by letting F aLs have the maximal derivative a until the “tank” of
excess probability mass is empty. This redistribution, which we may say is redistribution from the
left, may give a mass point in c, but not elsewhere. Moreover, redistribution from the right by starting
in c instead of b can be constructed in the same way. For expository purposes will we consider only
redistribution from the left and introduce the notation F aLs . The corresponding results for F
aH
s ,
redistribution from the right, follows by symmetry. Note that in this case of redistribution from the
right the continuous distribution may have a mass point at b.
To ease the notation let
F (x−) = limt→x−F (t) and Fjump(x) = F (x)− limt→x−F (t).
Definition 3.2 Let F ∈ CD[b, c] and define T aLF (Y ) by
i) T aLF (b) = F (b)
ii) if F is differentiable at x, then
T aL′F (x) = F
′(x)− a if F ′(x)− a > 0 or T aLF (x) > 0, and T aL′F (x) = 0 otherwise.
iii) if F not differentiable at x, then
T aLF (x) = T
aL
F (x
−) + Fjump(x)
Note that at any point the difference F (y) − T aLF (y) is by construction a continuous function
obeying the growth constraint a.
Definition 3.3 Let
ΦaL : CD[b, c] −→ CCD[b, c],
where CCD[b, c] denotes the set of continuous distributions defined on the interval [b, c], be given by
ΦaL(F ) = F aLs = F − T aLF .
In order to use Schauder’s fixed point theorem, we need continuity of ΦaL (and ΦaH) :
19
Proposition 3.1 The mapping ΦaL : CD[b, c] −→ CCD[b, c] is continuous.
The proof of this proposition is given in the appendix. We will use the maps ΦaL and ΦaH to ensure
that the distributions X(y) and N(y) are at desired form. In particular, that X(y) be a distribution
without mass points, and N(y) has potentially a mass point in y0, no probability mass between y0
and ymin and is continuous elsewhere.
We are now ready to describe the mapping
Γ : (X(y), N(y), k,M0, y
s)→ (Xˆ(y), Nˆ(y), kˆ, Mˆ0, yˆs)
1. We replace X(y) by X(y) = ΦaL(ΦaH(X(y))). Note that a redistribution from the left followed
by a redistribution from the right gives a distribution without mass points (if a ≥ 1).
The replacement of N(y) is done in two steps. First consider only the part of N(y) defined on
[ymin, ymax], Nemp(y), and compute Φ
aH(Nemp(y)).
Second we define N(y) = ΦaH(Nemp(y
min)) for all y in [y0, ymin]. With this replacement N(y)
has a potential mass point in y0, no probability mass between y0 and ymin), is continuous for
all y in [y0, ymax] and N(y) = ΦaH(N(y)) for all y in < ymin, ymax].
2. Note that u = N(y0). Let y
u be determined by u = X(yu). (The unemployed randomly search
jobs in the interval [ymin, yu].) Furthermore let θ(y) = min(θmax, kg(y)/x(y)). Let θ(y) = θmax
when x(y) = 0. Note that θ is naturally bounded from above (θmax) and below (θmin). These
bounds are explicitly given in the appendix.)
Finally, determine z(y) by the equality X(y) = N(z(y)) for y > yu.
3. For y > ys, M(y) = (y + ε+ (s+ δ)M0)/(r + s+ δ). For y ≤ ys
M(y) =
ys + ε+ (s+ δ)M0
r + s+ δ
−
∫ ys
y
dy
r + s+ δ + p(θ(z−1(y))
4. Update M0 as follows:
rM̂0 = y0 + p(θ(y
min)η(M(ymin)−M0).
5. Update of k. Calculate the profit flow pi(y) = q(θ(y))η(M(y) −M(z(y)) and the npv profit
Π(y) =
pi(y)
r + δ
, and update k as follows:
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k̂ =
EΠ(y)
K
k
6. Update of ys. Calculate ∆ = q(θ(ymax))η(M(ymax)−M(ys)). Update ys as follows
ŷs = ys +
∆− 
q(θ(ymax))ηM(ymax)
(ymax − ys)
7. Update of N(y). This goes in several steps. First define define θ˜(y) on y ∈ [ymin, ymax] as
(r + s+ δ)M(z(y)) = y + p((θ˜(y)))η[M(y)−M(z(y))] + (s+ δ)M(y0)
Given θ˜(y), calculate n˜(y) and û from the formula
k˜q(θ˜(y)) = [s+ δ + p(θ˜(z−1(y))]n˜(y) (26)
(1− û)s =
∫ y˜u
ymin
x(y)p(θ˜(y))dy
and define
Nˆ(y) =
∫ y
ymin
n˜(y)dy + uˆ∫ ymax
ymin
n˜(y)dy + uˆ
8. Update X(u). First define
x˜(y) = k̂θ˜(y)
Then update as follows:
Xˆ(y) =
∫ y
ymin
x˜(y)dy∫ ymax
ymin
x˜(y)dy
Note that each step of updating algorithm is continuous in the arguments of Γ. Moreover, that
Schauder’s fixed point theorem ensures existence of a fixed point. Denote all the variables at the
fixed-point by an asterix. First, at the fixed-point, M∗(y) satisfies (18). Furthermore, θ∗ satisfies
(17). Hence the search behaviour of workers and firms is optimal. By construction, expected profit is
zero, and the consistency requirements 6-8 are all satisfied.
Theorem 3.1 The equilibrium with continuous types exists.
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4 Linear adjustment costs
In the previous section we construct a competitive flavoured model for which the optimal solution
prescribes on-the-job search, and where high-productivity firms offer higher wages and grow faster
than low-productivity firms. In this section we analyse whether efficient on-the-job search obtains
with linear adjustment costs and possibly convex hiring costs. For simplicity, we work with a discrete
number of states.
With linear vacancy costs, the highest type of firms will open vacancies up to the point where the
marginal value of posting a vacancy is equal to the cost. With constant returns to scale in production,
the marginal value of a worker is independent of firm size. It follows that when the marginal value of
a vacancy is equal to the marginal cost for the most efficient firms, then no other firm types will find
it profitable to open vacancies. Hence, in steady state, N1 = N2 = ... = Nn−1 = 0. Thus there will
be no on-the-job search, for the trivial reason that only one firm type will be active in equilibrium.
Hence there will be no on-the-job search.
In order to have linear hiring costs and more than one firm type active in equilibrium, other parts
of the model has to be “convexified”. One way of doing this is to assume decreasing returns to scale
in production at the firm level. New-born firms will then adjust immediately to to their desired
employment level by posting infinitely many vacancies. In this section, we follow Lucas (1978), and
Sargent (1987), who argued that sluggish employment adjustment may be due to convex hiring costs.
Adjustment costs are organizational costs and training costs that firms incur when hiring new workers,
and in contrast with search costs they are not influenced by external labor market conditions. We
assume that the adjustment costs depend on gross hiring h = qv, and that the costs can be written as
γ(h), where h = qv. Furthermore, we assume that γ(0) = γ′(0) = 0 , that γ′() and γ′′() are strictly
positive for h > 0, and that limh→∞ γ′(h) =∞.
Consider a firm of type j that searches for workers and offers a wage Wj . The profit flow from
hiring can then be written as
pij = −c0v + vq(θ)(Mj −Wj)− γ(vq(θ))
= hMj − γ(h)− h[ c0
q(θ)
+W ] (27)
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where θ = f(W ). The firm maximizes profit with respect to W and H. The first order condition for
W reads
− c
q2
q′(f(W ))fw(W ) = 1
The condition is independent of the productivity of the firm, as well as of the hiring rate h. Denote
the solution by W ∗ and define θ∗ = f(W ∗). The first order condition for h reads
Mj − [ c0
q(θ∗)
+W ∗] = γ′(h) (28)
The left-hand side is the value of filling a position less the associated search-and wage costs associated
with filling it (which is unique even if W ∗ is not). The right-hand side shows the hiring costs. Given
our assumptions on γ, the solution is unique. The rest of the model is unaltered. In particular,
efficient on-the-job search implies that workers search so as to maximize joint income defined by (1).
Hence the equilibrium of the model is as defined above, with the profit function (5) replaced by (27).
It follows that in equilibrium, if it exists, there will be no on-the-job search. Suppose on-the-job
search does take place. Suppose workers in a firm of type i searches for a job in a firm of type j. Let
Wij denote the wage in the associated submarket. Efficient on-the-job search requires that Wij > Mi.
Since the type-i firm hired the worker in the first place, Mi >
c0
q(θ∗) + W
∗. Hence it would be more
profitable for the j-firm to follow the same hiring strategy as the i-firm, a contradiction.
Given that no on-the-job search takes place, it is trivial to show that the equilibrium exists, and
the proof is omitted. The next proposition follows
Proposition 4.1 Suppose the vacancy costs are linear while hiring costs are convex in the hiring rate
h = vq. Then the following is true
a) The optimal wage is independent of the productivity of the firm.
b) The optimal hiring rate is increasing in firm productivity
c) If K is sufficiently high, all firm types open vacancies.
d)) There is no on-the-job search, all firms hire workers from the unemployment pool.
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The get intuition for the absence of on-the-job search, note that although firms have different
productivity, the value of a match net of the hiring costs are equalized across firms. Hence there is no
welfare gain from reallocating workers from low-type to high-type firms.
5 Empirical implications
In this section we will briefly discuss testable differences in predictions between our model and some
other important models of on-the-job search. To this end, let Dw(w|wo) denote the distribution of
wages obtained after successful on-the-job search of a worker with a wage wo prior to the job switch.
Let Df (w|wn) denote the distribution of wages prior to the job switch for a worker that obtains a
wage wn after successful on-the-job search. Finally, Dp(y|y0) denote the distribution of productivities
in the new firms contingent on the productivity of the employer prior to the job change.
The Burdett-Mortensen (BM) model (Burdett-Mortensen, 1998). In the BM model, search is
random. With identical firms, firms play with mixed strategy, and a distribution of wages arise
endogenously. With heterogeneous firms, there is a one-to-one correspondence between wages and
productivities, as high-productivity firms pay more.
Since workers and firms match randomly, the distribution of wages Dw after successful on-the-job
search is equal to the wage offer distribution, truncated at previous wage wo. If the wage distribution
over vacancies is denoted by Fw(w), it follows that
Dw(w|wo) = F
w(w)− Fw(wo)
1− Fw(wo)
The support of the distribution D is [wo, ws], where ws is the supremum of the support of advertised
wages. Let Dw≥wj (w|woi ) denote the distribution function of new wages w, contingent on w ≥ wj , as
a function of the old wage woi . Then for any wj ≥ woh,
Dw≥wjw (w|woi ) =
Dw(w|woi )−Dw(wj |woi )
1−Dw≥wjw (wj |woi )
=
Fw(w)− Fw(wj)
1− Fw(wj)
independently of woi . Hence D
w≥wj
w (w|wol ) = Dw≥wjw (w|woh) for any wj > who . In words, the distribu-
tion of new wages, contingent on being above wj , is independent on the previous wage, as long as the
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previous wage is below wj .
Similarly, the distribution of prior wages Df (w|wn) is equal to the distribution of wages over
employees (including unemployment benefit) truncated at w ≤ wn. Consider two wages wnl and wnh ,
wnl ≤ wnh , and let Dw≤wjf (w|wn) denote the distribution of the prior wage w prior to the job change.
It follows that as long as wj ≤ wnl , Dw≤wjf (w|wnl ) = Dw≤wjf (w|wnh).
If firms are heterogeneous, there will be a one-to-one correspondence between a firm’s wage and
its wage offer. Hence, as with wages, the productivity distribution in new firms, D
y≥yj
p (y|y0) will be
independent of y0 as long as y0 < yj .
The Postel-Vinay and Robin (PR) wage setting procedure. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) assume
that after successful on-the-job search, the incumbent firm and the new firm compete for the worker
in a Bertrand fashion. Furthermore, firms compete in NPV wages, hence a worker takes into account
that expected future wages (after encountering another job offer) will be higher the higher is the
productivity of the employer. The latter is referred to as the option value of the job.
Since workers meet firms randomly, and change employer if and only if she matches with a firm
that is more productive than the current employer, the results for the BM model on productivity
distributions carry over to the PR model. In particular, the productivity distribution in new firms,
D
y≥yj
p (y|y0) will be independent of y0 as long as y0 < yj
The distribution of wages after a job shift is less clear. Betrand competition will tend to increase
wages after a job swithc. On the other hand, the fact that the option value is increasing in productivity
implies that, given the productivity of the current employer, there is a negative relationship between
wages in the new job and the productivity of the new employer.
Competitive on-the-job search (CS). Our model is not a model of wages, but rather of NPV wages.
However, we can assume that the wage that the worker obtains in a firm is constant, and that the
workers’ search behaviour is contracted upon directly. With a continuum of types, the wage before he
job switch is an increasing function of the wage before the job switch. It follows that the distribution
Dw(w|wo) then has a spike, at a discrete distance above wo, and the wage at the spike will be
increasing in wo. The same is true for the productivity distribution Dy(y|yo). Another prediction
from competitive on-the-job search (with discrete types) is that more productive firms pay higher
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wages than less productive firms, even if they attract workers from firms with the same productivity.
Thus, the BM model and the competitive search model have different predictions regarding the
relationship between wages before and after a job change. The same is true for the productivity of
the previous employer relative to the new one. In the PR model, the productivity distributions before
and after the wage change is as in the BM model, and thus very different from the predictions of the
CS model. The relationship between wages before and after wage changes is more involved in the PR
model. Still there is one clear difference. The competitive search model predicts that if two firms with
different productivities attract workers with equally productive employers, the high-productivity firm
pays the higher wage. The PR model predicts the opposite.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a competitively flavored matching model where on-the-job search is an optimal
response to productivity differences between firms in the presence of search frictions. The equilibrium
features a job ladder, where workers gradually moves to jobs with higher wages. With a continuum
of firm types, the job ladder is strict. Unlike existing models of labor turnover, the model predicts a
strong relationship between the productivity of the present and future employer.
The papers also contributes methodologically. When proving existence of equilibrium, we do not
follow the standard route, which is to apply a version of Schauder’s fixed point theorem presented in
Stokey and Lucas (1989). Instead we utilize that the equilibrium is formulated in terms of distribution
functions, which allows for a different approach. We believe that our methodology may be a usefull
tool for showing existence of equilibrium in search models more generally.
Finally, we show that if the costs of maintaining vacancies are linear, there will be no on-the-job
search, even if we include convex hiring costs. Hence convex hiring costs seem to be necessary in order
to explain the stylized facts of on-the-job search.
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Appendix 1, finite number of firm types
Proof of claim prior to lemma 2.1
We want to show that y0/r ≤ M0 < M1 < ... < Mn and (r + s + δ)Mi − yi is decreasing in i. An
unemployed worker obtains y0/r, hence y0/r ≤ M0. A type n worker cannot gain from on-the-job
search since W ≤ yn, and hence Mn = yn/(r+s+δ). A worker and a firm of type j (hereafter referred
to as a worker of type j) can always obtain a strictly higher joint income than a worker of type i < j
by following exactly the same search strategy as the type i worker, hence Mj > Mi. Analogously, a
worker of type i can always mimic the search strategy of a worker of type j > i. Let the associated
joint income be denoted M ′i . From (1),
(r + s+ δ)(Mj −M ′i) = yj − yi
or
(r + s+ δ)Mj − yj = (r + s+ δ)M ′i − yi
Since M ′i ≤Mi it follows that (r + s+ δ)Mj − yj ≤ (r + s+ δ)Mi − yi.
Proof of lemma 2.1
a) We want to show that the indifference curve has the following single crossing property: Suppose
i < j ≤ n′. Then there exists a wage W ′ such that fi(W ′,M) = fj(W ′,M), fi(W,M) < fj(W,M)
for all W < W ′, and fi(W,M) > fj(W,M) for all W > W ′.
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Note that limW→M+j fj = ∞ while fi(Mj ,M) < ∞. Thus, for W close to but above Mj we have
that fi(W,M) < fj(W,M). The ratio of p(fi) to p(fj) reads
p(fi)
p(fj)
=
(r + s+ δ)Mi − yi − (s+ δ)M0
(r + s+ δ)Mj − yj − (s+ δ)M0
W −Mj
W −Mi
lim
W→∞
p(fi)
p(fj)
=
(r + s+ δ)Mi − yi − (s+ δ)M0
(r + s+ δ)Mj − yj − (s+ δ)M0 < 1
(from a in this lemma). Thus, for sufficiently large values of W , p( fi(W ;M)) < p(fj(W,M)), and
hence fi(W ;M) < fj(W,M). Since fi and fj are continuous it follows that there exists a value W
′
such that fi(W
′;M) = fj(W ′,M).
b) Suppose now that i < j < k. Let W ik be the unique solution to fi(W ;M) = fk(W ;M).
Suppose W ik < W ij . From the single-crossing property just arrived it follows that fi < fj for all
W < W ij and that fk < fj for all W > W
ik. Since, by assumption,W ik < W ij , it follows that
hence fj(W ;M) > f(W,M). Since all workers types at or below except the highest search this is a
contradiction.
For wages below M1, only type zero workers will apply, hence f(W,M) = f0(W ;M). At W
1 =
W 01, f0(W
1;M) = f1(W ;M). Let W
2 = W 12. Then f(W ) = f2(W ;M) for W ∈ [W 1,W 2] (which
may have zero measure) and so forth. Furthermore, by definition type n′ gains from search, and hence
searches for a job with a wage W ≤ W s. Hence there must be an interval [W,W s] at which fn′ = fn
c) For all i ≤ n′, each of the functions fi(W ;M) is continuously differentiable for W > Mi. It
follows that f(W ;M) = mini fi(W ;M) is continuous and piecewise differentiable for all W < Mn′+1.
However, as the nominator in (3) is zero for i = n′+1, it follows that fn′+1 is zero for any W > Mn′+1.
Hence f is discontinuous at Mn′+1,as it jumps down to zero at this point.
Proof of lemma 2.2
Suppose a submarket attracts i−workers and j-workers, i < j. Denote the npv wage in the submarket
by W ′. Then fi(W ′,M) = fj(W ′,M) = f(W ′,M). From lemma (2.1) this can only be the case if
j = i+ 1, that is, if W ′ = W i.
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From lemma 2.1 it follows that
lim
W→W i−
∂q(θ(W i))
∂W
= lim
W→W i−
q′(θ(Wi))
∂θ(W i)
∂W
< lim
W→W i−
q′(θ(Wi))
∂θ(W i)
∂W
= lim
W→W i−
∂q(θ(W i))
∂W
It follows that W = W i cannot be a solution to any firm’s maximization problem and hence cannot
be an equilibrium wage. Hence a submarket cannot contain two different worker types.
Suppose then that two firm types i and j, i < j offer the wage W ′. The optimal wage for firm j
solves
max
v,W
−c(v) + vq(f(W ))[Mj −W ]
with first order condition for W given by
q′(f(W ))f ′(W )
q
=
1
Mj −W (29)
The left-hand side is independent of j, while the right hand side is increasing in j. It follows that the
first order conditions cannot be satisfied for two different firm types simultaneously.
In order to derive (10), first note that
dp−1(θ)
dθ
=
1
p′(θ)
=
1
q + θq′(θ)
(since p(θ) = θq(θ)). From (3) it thus follows that
f ′(W ) = − 1
q + θq′(θ)
θq(θ)
W −Mi (30)
which inserted into (29) gives
− q
′(θ)
q + θq′(θ)
θq(θ)
W −Mi =
q
Mj −W
Inserting η = −q′(θ)θ/q(θ) and reorganizing slightly gives
η
1− η =
W −Mi
Mj −W
By assumption, the left-hand side is decreasing and the right-hand side is increasing in W . Thus, for
given Mi and Mj the equation uniquely defines W .
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Proof of existence of equilibrium
The strategy for the proof is to construct a mapping for which the equilibrium of the model is a fixed
point, and then apply Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to show existence.
The domain of the mapping is κ, a matrix describing submarket choices of workers κij , Σ
n
i=0κij = 1,
a matrix θ consisting of labor market tightnesses θij , and a real number k denoting the measure of
firms in the economy. We impose that 0 ≤ θij ≤ θmax for all i < j, and that k ≤ kmax, where θmax
and kmax will be defined below. It follows that the domain Dn ∈ R2n2+1 of (κ, θ, k) is closed and
convex.
We construct the mapping Γ : Dn → Dn as follows: Let p denote the matrix of transition
probabilities pij = p(θij). Define
(r + s+ δ)Mi = yi + (s+ δ)M0 + max
j
pijη(θij)(Mj −Mi) (31)
(r + s+ δ)Mij = yi + (s+ δ)M0 + pijη(θij)(Ml −Mj) for any j > i (32)
Let M denote the matrix of values Mij . Given the matrix p(θ), the matrix M = M(θ) is uniquely
defined as a continuous function of θ. To see this, first note that Mn is independent of θ. Suppose
Mi is uniquely defined and continuous functions of θ for all i > i
′. But then it follows from (31) that
Mi′ is uniquely defined and continuous in θ as well. The claim thus follows.
The gross income flow of a firm of type j of posting a vacancy in submarket i is given by
ρij = q(θij)(1− η(θij))(Mj −Mij) (33)
ρj = max
i
ρij . (34)
Now define θaij implicitly by the function
q(θaij)(1− η(θaij))(Mj −Mij) = ρj (35)
Given our assumption that η(θ) is nondecreasing in θ we know that θaij is well defined. The equation
thus shows values θaij such that the firm of type j is indifferent between searching in submarket i and
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in the income maximizing submarket given θ. Let vaj be defined by the equation
c′(vaj ) = ρj
i.e., vaj is the optimal number of vacancies given ρj . It follows that both θ
a
and vaj are continuous
functions of θ.
The expected profit of a firm of type j entering the market reads (from (34))
Πj =
1
r + δ
{
vaj ρj − c(vaj )
}
Define
EΠ =
∑
j
αjΠj
The updating rule for k reads
k̂ = k
EΠ
K
(36)
unless the upper bound kmax binds, in which case k̂ = kmax.
Given the initial vector θ and κ, we can calculate the distribution N0, N1, ..., Nn. The outflow of
workers of type i to firms of type j > i is Nip(θij)κij . Hence, the inflow equal to outflow requirement
can be written as
Ni(s+ δ + Σ
n
j=i+1p(θij)κij) = Σ
i−1
j=0p(θij)κijNj for i = 1, ..., n− 1
which uniquely defines N1, ..., Nn as continuous functions of θ. The measure of unemployed workers
can be defined residually, N0 = Σ
n
j=1Nj .
Generically, consistency requires that for each firm type,
∑
i
Niκijθij ≡
∑
i
vij = kαjvj
(where vij is the total measure of vacancies in the i, j market). Define the constant ζj(θ) by the
expression ∑
i
Niκijθ
a
ij = ζj k̂αiv
a
j (37)
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Define
θ̂ij = ζj(θ)θ
a
ij(θ)
This is our updating rule for rule for θ unless the upper bound θmax binds, in which case θ̂ij = θ
max.
Consider the searching workers. Let zi denote the set of firm types j such that Mij = Mi. For
all i, j, j /∈ zi, define
κaij =
Mij
Mj
κij
Note that κaij is continuous in θ and κij . Define the constant σi by the expression
σi
∑
j∈zi
κij +
∑
j /∈zi
κaij = 1
For all i, j such that j ∈ Ji, the updating rule reads
κ̂ij = ηiκij
(It thus follows that
∑
j κ̂ij = 1 for all i.)
We have thus constructed a mapping Γ : Dn → Dn, which by construction is continuous. It follows
from Brouwers fixed point theorem that the mapping has a fixed point.
Our next step is to show that a fixed point of Γ is an equilibrium of our model (given that the
bounds are sufficiently large, see below). First, the asset values M∗i and M
∗
ij are determined using the
optimal sharing rule (equation 31 and (32). Second, κ∗ij > 0 only if M
∗
ij = M
∗
i , which ensures efficient
on-the-job search. It follows that the other markets are empty. Firms are indifferent between which
of the non-empty submarkets to enter, hence their search decisions are optimal.7 Finally, (36) implies
that EΠ∗ = K at the fixed point, hence the entry condition is satisfied.
At the fixed point, ζj = 1 for all j. Hence (37) is satisfied. However, this means that the weights
τij give us enough degrees of freedom to satisfy the consistency requirement N
∗
i θ
∗
ijκ
∗
ij = v
∗
j τ
∗
ijk
∗ in
each submarket.
7The labor market tightness θ∗ij in empty submarkets are pinned down by iso-profit curve of firms, see equation (35).
Workers flow to the submarkets that maximize their income given the iso-profit curve of the workers. In the model, it
is the indifference curve of the workers that defines θij in empty submarkets. Since maximizing worker income given
the iso-profit of firms and maximizing profits given the indifference curves of workers are dual problems, they give the
same solution.
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Finally, we characterize the upper bounds. First consider k. An upper bound on the expected
profit of entering the market is given by
Π˜ =
yn
αn
1
k
which converges to zero as k →∞. Hence it is trivial to pick an upper bound that is not binding at
the fixed point. For instance, we may let k̂ be defined by ynαn
1
k̂
= K/2.
Then consider θ. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose θij is infinite for some i, j, i > j. Then
no firm of type l < j will attract any workers. Without loss of generality we therefore assume that
i = 0. Unless θik = ∞ for some k > j, κij = 1, it is always be better to search further with higher
present income. Suppose first that θik is finite for k > j. Since outflow from unemployment has to be
equal to inflow, we have that
x(u, v0j) = x(0, v0j) = 0 = s+ δ
a contradiction. Suppose then that θik =∞ for some k > j. Then the argument can be repeated for
the highest type for which θ is infinite. Hence θij is finite for all ij, and hence has an upper bound
θmax. This completes the proof.
Proof of efficiency
The welfare function is defined as
W =
∫ ∞
0
[
n∑
j=0
Njyj −
n∑
j=1
αjkc(vj)− aK]e−rtdt
Where vj is the number of vacancies of a firm of type j. The law of motions are
N˙j =
j−1∑
i=0
x(κijNi, αjkτijvj)−
n∑
k=j+1
x(κjkNj , αikτkjvj)− (s+ δ)Nj
k˙ = a− δk
The initial conditions take care of the requirement that
∑
iNi = 1. The controls are a, κij , τij and vj .
All κij , τij have to be between zero and 1, this will be discussed later. The current-value Hamiltonian
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reads
H =
n∑
j=0
Njyj −
n∑
j=1
αjkc(vj)− aK
+
n∑
j=0
λj [
j−1∑
i=0
x(κijNi, αjkτijvj)−
n∑
k=j+1
x(κjkNj , αkkτjkvj)− (s+ δ)Nj ]
+A[a− δf ]
The controls are chosen so as to maximize H. Note that xv = (1− η)q(θ), where η = −q′(θ)θ/q.8The
first order conditions for the other controls read
A = K (38)
pij(λj − λi) = max
k
pik(λi − λk) if κij > 0 (39)
qij(λj − λi) = max
k
qkj(λj − λk) if τij > 0. (40)
We thus get the following first order conditions for vacancy creation:
c′(vj) = (1− β)q(θij)[λj − λi] (41)
for all ij for which κij>0 (note that the right-hand side is the same for all active submarkets). Finally,
the value functions for the adjoint variables are given by (in steady state)
(r + s+ δ)λj = yj + βmax
k>j
pjk(λk − λj) + (s+ δ)λu (42)
(r + δ)A =
n∑
j=1
αj [(1− β)vj max
k
qjk(λk − λj)− c(vj)]
It follows that the first order conditions of the planner is exactly equal to the market solution. More
than that, the maximization problem for the controls is exactly equal to the maximization problem
of the firm. Thus, the planner’s solution and the decentralized solution is the same.
Proof of proposition 2.3
a) Let h > l, and suppose a firm of type h advertise a wage Wh with job finding rate qh, while the
firm of type l advertise a wage W l with job finding rate ql. From worker indifference it follows that
8To see this, note that q(θ) = x( 1
θ
, 1). From the Euler equation it follows that
xu(
1
θ
, 1)
1
θ
+ xv = x(
1
θ
, 1) = q
which gives the expression in the text.
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Wh > W l if and only if qh > ql, otherwise all workers would prefer to search for firm h rather than
firn l. Profit maximization then implies that
qh(Mh −Wh) ≥ ql(Mh −W l)
ql(Ml −W l) ≥ qh(Ml −Wh)
Combining the two gives
qh(Mh −Wh)− qh(Ml −Wh) ≥ ql(Ml −W l)− ql(Mh −W l)
or
(qh − ql)(Mh −Ml) ≥ 0 (43)
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose W l > Wh. Then ql > qh. Since Ml < Mh, this contradicts
(43).
From lemma 2.1 we know that fi(W ) = f(W ) at the interval [W
i−1,W i]. Furthermore, from the
proof of lemma 2.2 we know that W i cannot be an equilibrium point. It follows that a worker of type
j always searches for higher wages than a worker of type i < j.
b) Suppose on the contrary that Il has an element, say i, that is strictly greater than one element
in Ik, say j. From a) it follows that worker i searches for strictly higher wages than worker j. Hence
firm l advertises a wage that is strictly higher than a wage advertising by firm k, l < k. We know
from a) that this is a contradiction.
Appendix 2, continuum of firm types
Proof of Proposition 3.1
The key ingredient is the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1 Let F,G ∈ CD[b, c], and let G be in a δ-neighborhood of F with the sup-norm, then
T aLF (y)− T aLG (y) < 2δ.
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Let t(y) be defined by F (y) + δ = G(y) + t(y). In other words t(y) is the distance to the “roof”
of the δ-neighborhood for every y. Note that ∆F −∆G = ∆t for all intervals in [b, c]. This implies
that F ′(y) − G′(y) = t′(y), for all y where both F and G are differentiable. Moreover, this relation
also applies to jump points, as by definition : Fjump(y) = Gjump(y) + tjump(y).
We want to show that T aL′F (y) − T aL′G (y) ≤ t′(y). Note that T aL′F (y) − T aL′G (y) = F ′(y) − a −
(G′(y) − a) = F ′(y) − G′(y) = t′(y) if F ′(x) − a > 0 and G′(x) − a > 0. Similarly if only F surpass
the growth constraint: T aL′F (y) − T aL′G (y) = F ′(y) − a ≤ F ′(y) − G′(y) = t′(y) since G′(y) ≤ a. The
inequality is trivially satisfied when only G surpass the growth constraint. The subcases regarding
jump points follows by the same kind of computation. Intuitively, the difference in incremental growth
at any point y, is precisely the change in the distance to the “roof” of the δ-neighborhood. Since this
difference in incremental growth necessarily is the maximum difference of accumulated mass that may
arise in any point, the inequality follows
Since this applies for any point y, it follows that
T aLF (y)− T aLG (y) =
∫ y
b
(T aL′F (x)− T aL′G (x))dx ≤
∫ y
b
t′(x)dx = t(y)− t(b) < 2δ
The result now follows readily from the triangle inequality:
Proposition 6.1 ΦaL : CD[b, c] −→ CCD[b, c] is continuous.
Let F ∈ CD[b, c], and let G be a CD in a δ-neighborhood of F (with the sup-norm). Since
F (y) = Fs(y)+T
aL
F (y) and G(y) = Gs(y)+T
aL
G (y), we get by the triangle inequality |Fs(y)−Gs(y)| ≤
|F −G|+ |T aLF (y)−T aLG (y)| < δ+2δ = 3δ. In other words, for any given , we will ensure |Fs−Gs| < 
provided we choose |F −G| < 3 .
Proposition 6.2 Let Φ : CD[b, c] −→ CCD[b, c]. IF Φ(G) = G whenever G is continuous, then Φ is
discontinuous.
Let Φ denote a mapping that leaves continuous distributions unchanged. Let G denote a distribu-
tion that is continuous everywhere except at at y0, where it has a jump point. Construct a sequence
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Gn of continuous functions by letting Gn(y) = G(y) for all y except the interval < y0− 1n , y0 >. In this
interval the graph of the function Gn is the line between the points (y0− 1n , G(y0− 1n ) and (y0, G(y0)).
By construction Gn is continuous and converges to G as n approaches infinity. The contradiction now
follows from invoking continuity of Φ, as continuity implies Φ(limn→∞Gn) = limn→∞Φ(Gn). Hence,
we get: Φ(G) = Φ(limn→∞Gn) = limn→∞ Φ(Gn) = limn→∞Gn = G. But Φ(G) 6= G, since Φ(G) is
continuous and G is not.
Upper and lower bounds for key parameters in the updating algorithm of Γ
Definition of θmin: A natural lower bound arise from solving p(θ)y
max−y0
r+s+δ = . In other words, θ
min is
given by:
θmin = p−1(
(r + s+ δ)
ymax − y0 )
Definition of kmax: The upper bound for the aggregate output in the economy is achieved if all workers
work in the most productive firms. This gives rise to the following steady state condition:
ymax/k = (r + δ)K
Hence kmax is given by:
kmax =
ymax
(r + δ)K
Definition of θmax: The highest value of θmax is realized in the submarket with the firms with the
lowest productivities, since they offer the lowest wages. We will show that since ymin > y0, the labour
market tightness in this submarket has an upper bound.
First we derive a lower bound for the unemployment rate. For a given number of firms, the number
of matches is maximized by if all submarkets have the same θ. Moreover, the unemployment rate
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is the lowest if all firms hire unemployed workers only. This give rise to the following steady state
condition:
umin(s+ δ + p(
kmax
umin
)) = s+ δ
Let θh = K
max
umin , and p
h be the corresponding value of p. It follows that ph is an upper bound for
the average value of the hazard rate out of unemployment. Since p(θ(yu)) < p(θ(y)) for all y < yu,
it follows that p(θ(yu)) < ph. Suppose that the workers employed in firms with ymin join the same
submarket as workers searching for the yu-jobs. This is feasible, but not optimal. Let M˜(ymin) denote
the corresponding expected income. (Note that M˜(ymin) < M(ymin)) It follows that
(r + s+ δ)M˜(ymin) = ymin + p(θ(yu))(W (y)− M˜(ymin)
Or
(r + s+ δ)(M(ymin)−M(y0)) > (r + s+ δ)(M˜(ymin)−M(y0)) > y
min − y0
r + s+ δ + ph
Let
∆ ≡ y
min − y0
r + s+ δ + ph
An upper bound for M(y0), M
max
0 , is
Mmax0 =
ymax
r + s
Finally, define θmax by
(r + s+ δ)Mmax0 = y0 + p¯(θ
maxη(θmax)∆
Since η(θ) is nondecreasing in θ, this equation defines θ∗ uniquely.
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Endogenous number of vacancies per firm
Assume now that the number of vacancies is a (contiuous) choice variable of the firm, and that the
maintainance cost is c(v). We make the same assumptions as in the discrete case. In addition we
assume that there exists an upper bound vmax on v, and that limv→vmax− =∞.
Let v(y) denote the number of vacancies posted by a firm of type y. The first order condition for
v(y) writes (analogue with (13) in the discrete case)
c′(v(y)) = (1− η)q(θ)[M(y)−M(z(y))] (44)
Define v¯ as the aggregate number of vacancies, v¯ =
∫ ymax
ymin
v(y)g(y)dy. Define g˜(y) ≡ g(y)v(y)/v¯.
Define k˜ = kv¯. Finally, write the profits as pi(y) = vq(θ)[M(y)−W ]− c(v).
An equilibrium can now be defined as above, with v(y) as an additional equilibrium object, with
firms maximizing profit with respect to w and v (not only w), and with g and k replaced by g˜ and k˜
in the aggregate consistency equations. In all other respects the equilibrum conditions are unchanged.
The next step is to modify the mapping. Define V (y) =
∫ y
ymin
v(y′)dy′. Clearly V (y) is monotone
and increasing, and bounded above by V¯ = (ymax − ymin)vmax. Let V (y) be an element of the
mapping, and in the first step of the mapping, write V (y) = ΦaL(ΦaH(V (y))) After step 5 in the
updating procedure, update v(y) by (44). It follows that the mapping is continuous, and that the
conditions for using Schauder’s fix-point theorem still applies. Hence the equilibrium exists.
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